Finally, let the preacher br armed
against certain arguments of laymen, and even of some learned men,
who deny, up to a certain point, that there are witches. For,
although they conceded the malice and power of the devil to inflict
such evils at his will, they deny that the Divine permission is
granted to him, and will not admit that God allows such things to be
done. And although they have no method in their argument, groping
blindly now this way and now that, it is yet necessary to reduce
their assertions to five arguments, from which all their cavillings
proceed. And the first is, that God does not permit the devil to rage
against men wish such great power.
The
question put is whether the Divine permission must always accompany
an infliction caused by the devil through a witch. And give arguments
are submitted to prove that God does not permit it, and that
therefore there is no witchcraft in the world. And the first argument
is taken from God; the second from the devil; the third from the
witch; the fourth from the affliction ascribed to witchcraft; and the
fifth from the preachers and judges, on the assumption that they have
so preached against and punished witches that they would have no
security in life.
And first as
follows: God can punish men for their sins, and He punishes with the
sword, famine, and pestilence; as well as with various and countless
other infirmities to which human nature is subject. Wherefore, there
being no need for Him to add further punishments, He does not permit
witchcraft.
Secondly, if that which is
said of the devil were true, namely, that he can obstruct the
generative forces so that a woman cannot conceive, or that if she
does conceive, he can cause an abortion; or, if there is no abortion,
he can cause the children to be killed after birth; in that case he
would be able to destroy the whole world; and it could also be said
that the devil's works were stronger than God's, since the Sacrament
of matrimony is a work of God.
Thirdly, they argue from man himself, that if there were any
witchcraft in the world, then some men would be more bewitched than
others; and that it is a false argument to say that men are bewitched
for a punishment of their sins, and therefore false to maintain that
there is witchcraft in the world. And they prove that it is false by
arguing that, if it were true, then the greater sinners would receive
the greater punishment, and that this is not the case; for sinners
are less punished sometimes than the just, as is seen in the case of
innocent children who are alleged to be bewitched.
Their fourth argument can be added to that which they adduce
concerning God; namely, that a thing which a man can prevent and does
not prevent, but allows it to be done, may be judged to proceed from
his will. But since God is All-Good, He cannot wish evil, and
therefore cannot permit evil to be done which He is able to
prevent.
Again, taking their argument
from the infliction itself, which is alleged to be due to witchcraft;
they submit that they are similar to natural infirmities and defects,
and may therefore by cause by a natural defect. For it may happen
through some natural defect that a man becomes lame, or blind, or
loses his reason, or even dies; wherefore such things cannot
confidently be ascribed to witches.
Lastly, they argue that preachers and judges have preached and
practised against witches in such a way that, if there were witches,
their lives would never be safe from them on account of the great
hatred that witches would have for them.
But the contrary arguments may be taken from the First Question,
where it treats of the third postulate of the First Part; and those
points may be propounded to the people which are most fitting. How
God permits evil to be, even though He does not wish it; but He
permits it for the wonderful perfecting of the universe, which may be
considered in the fact that good things are more highly commendable,
are more pleasing and laudable, when they are compared with bad
things; and authority can be quoted in support of this. Also that the
depth of God's Divine wisdom, justice, and goodness should be shown
forth, whereas it would otherwise remain hidden.
For a brief settlement of this question there are various
treatises available on this subject for the information of the
people, to the effect, namely, that God justly permitted two Falls,
that of the Angels and that of our first parents; and since these
were the greatest of all falls, it is no matter for wonder if other
smaller ones are permitted. But it is in their consequences that
those two Falls were the greatest, not in their circumstances, in
which last respect, as was shown in the last Question, the sins of
witches exceed those of the bad angels and our first parents. In the
same place it is shown how God justly permitted those first Falls,
and anyone is at liberty to collect and enlarge upon what is there
said as much as he wishes.
But we must
answer their arguments. As to the first, that God punishes quite
enough by means of natural diseases, and by sword and famine, we make
a threefold answer. First, that God did not limit His power to the
processes of nature, or even to the influences of the stars, in such
a way that He cannot go beyond those limits; for He has often
exceeded them in the punishment of sins, by sending plagues and other
afflictions beyond all the influence of that stars; as when He
punished the sin of pride in David, when he numbered the people, by
sending a pestilence upon the people.
Secondly, it agrees with the Divine wisdom that He should so govern
all things that He allows them to act at their own instigation.
Consequently, it is not His purpose to prevent altogether the malice
of the devil, but rather to permit it as far as He sees it to be for
the ultimate good of the universe; although it is true that the devil
is continually held in check by the good Angels, so that he may not
do all the harm that he wishes. Similarly He does not propose to
restrain the human sins which are possible to man through his
free-will, such as the abnegation of the Faith, and the devotion of
himself to the devil, which things are in the power of the human
will. From these two premisses it follows that, when God is most
offended, He justly permits those evils which are chiefly sought for
by witches, and for which they deny the Faith, up to the extent of
the devil's power; and such is the ability to injure men, animals,
and the fruits of the earth.
Thirdly,
God justly permits those evils which indirectly cause the greatest
uneasiness and torment to the devil; and of such a sort are those
evils which are done by witches through the power of devils. For the
devil is indirectly tormented very greatly when he sees that, against
his will, God uses all evil for the glory of His name, for the
commendation of the Faith, for the purgation of the elect, and for
the acquisition of merit. For it is certain that nothing can be more
galling to the pride of the devil, which he always rears up against
God (as it is said: The pride of them that hate Thee increases ever),
than that God should convert his evil machinations to His own glory.
Therefore God justly permits all these things.
Their second argument has been answered before; but there are
two points in it which must be answered in detail. In the first
place, far from its being true that the devil, or his works, as
stronger than God, it is apparent that his power is small, since he
can do nothing without the Divine permission. Therefore it may be
said that the devil's power is small in comparison with the Divine
permission, although it is very great in comparison with earthly
powers, which it naturally excels, as is shown in the often quoted
text in Job xi: There is no power on earth to be compared with
him.
In the second place, we must
answer the question with God permits witchcraft to affect the
generative powers more than any other human function. This has been
dealt with above, under the title, How witches can obstruct the
generative powers and the venereal act. For it is on account of the
shamefulness of that act, and because the original sin due to the
guilt of our first parents is inherited by means of that act. It is
symbolized also by the serpent, who was the first instrument of the
devil.
To their third we answer that
the devil has more intention and desire to tempt the good than the
wicked; although he does in fact tempt the wicked more than the good,
for the reason that the wicked have more aptitude than the good to
respond to his temptation. In the same way, he is more eager to
injure the good than the bad, but he finds it easier to injure the
wicked. And the reason for this is, according to S. Gregory, that the
more often a man gives way to the devil, the harder he makes it for
himself to struggle against him. But since it is the wicked who most
often give way to the devil, their temptations are the hardest and
most frequent, as they have not the shield of Faith with which to
protect themselves. Concerning this shield S. Paul speaks in
Ephesians vi. Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith
ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked. But on
the other hand, he assails the good more bitterly than the wicked.
And the reason for this is that he already possesses the wicked, but
not the good; and therefore he tried the harder to draw into his
power through tribulation the just, who are not his, than the wicked,
who are already his. In the same way, an earthly prince more severely
chastises those who disobey his laws, or injure his kingdom, that
those who do not set themselves against him.
In answer to their fourth argument, in addition to what has
already been written on this subject, the preacher can expound the
truth that God permits evil to be done, but does not wish it to be
done, by the five signs of the Divine will, which are Precept,
Prohibition, Advice, Operation, and Permission. See S. Thomas,
especially in his First Part, quest. 19, art. 12, where this is very
plainly set forth. For although there is only one will in God, which
is God Himself, just as His Essence is One; yet in respect of its
fulfilment, His will is shown and signified to us in many ways, as
the Psalm says: The mighty works of the Lord are fulfilled in
all His wishes. Wherefore there is a distinction between the actual
essential Will of God and its visible effects; even as the will,
properly so called, is the will of a man's good pleasure, but in a
metaphorical sense it is the will expressed by outward signs. For it
is by signs and metaphors that we are shown that God wishes this to
be.
We may take an example from a
human father who, while he has only one will in himself, expresses
that will in five ways, either by his own agency, or through that of
someone else. Through his own agency he expresses it in two ways,
either directly or indirectly. Directly, when he himself does a
thing; and then it is Operation. Indirectly, when he does not hinder
someone else from acting (see Aritotle's Physics, IV:
Prohibition is indirect causation), and this is called the sign of
Permission. And the human father signifies his will through the
agency of someone else in three ways. Either he orders someone to do
something, or conversely forbids something; and these are the signs
of Precept and Prohibition. Or he persuades and advises someone to do
something; and this is the sign of Advice. And just as the human will
is manifested in these five ways, so is God's will. For that God's
will is shown by Precept, Prohibition, and Advice is seen in S.
Matthew vi: Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven: that is
to say, may we on earth fulfil His Precepts, avoid His Prohibitions,
and follow His Advice. And in the same way, S. Augustine shows that
Permission and Operation are signs of God's will, where he says in
the Enchiridion: Nothing is done unless Almighty God wishes it
to be done, either by permitting it or by Himself doing it.
To return to the argument; it is perfectly true
that when a man can prevent a thing, and does not, that thing may be
said to proceed from his will. And the inference that God, being
All-Good, cannot wish evil to be done, is also true in respect of the
actual Good Pleasure of God's Will, and also in respect of four of
the signs of His Will; for it is needless to say that He cannot
operate evil, or command evil to be done, or fail to be opposed to
evil, or advise evil; but He can, however, permit evil to be done.
And if it is asked how it is possible to
distinguish whether an illness is caused by witchcraft or by some
natural physical defect, we answer that there are various methods.
And the first is by means of the judgement of doctors. See the words
of S. Augustine On the Christian Doctrine: To this class of
superstition belong all charms and amulets suspended or bound about
the person, which the School of Medicine despises. For example,
doctors may perceive from the circumstances, such as the patient's
age, healthy complexion, and the reaction of his eyes, that his
disease does not result from any defect of the blood or the stomach,
or any other infirmity; and they therefore judge that it is not due
to any natural defect, but to some extrinsic cause. And since that
extrinsic cause cannot be any poisonous infection, which would be
accompanied by ill humours in the blood and stomach, they have
sufficient reason to judge that it is due to witchcraft.
And secondly, when the disease is incurable, so that
the patient can be relieved by no drugs, but rather seems to be
aggravated by them.
Thirdly, the evil
may come so suddenly upon a man that it can only be ascribed to
witchcraft. An example of how this happened to one man has been made
known to us. A certain well-born citizen of Spires had a wife who was
of such an obstinate disposition that, though he tried to please her
in every way, yet she refused in nearly every way to comply with his
wishes, and was always plaguing him with abusive taunts. It happened
that, on going into his house one day, and his wife railing against
him as usual with opprobrious words, he wished to go out of the house
to escape from quarrelling. But she quickly ran before him and locked
the door by which he wished to go out; and loudly swore that, unless
he beat her, there was no honesty or faithfulness in him. At these
heavy words he stretched out his hand, not intending to hurt her, and
struck her lightly with his open palm on the buttock; whereupon he
suddenly fell to the ground and lost all his senses, and lay in bed
for many weeks afflicted with a most grievous illness. Now it is
obvious that this was not a natural illness, but was caused by some
witchcraft of the woman. And very many similar cases have happened,
and been made known to many.
There are
some who can distinguish such illnesses by means of a certain
practice, which is as follows. They hold molten lead over the sick
man, and pour it into a bowl of water. And if the lead condenses into
some image, they judge that the sickness is due to witchcraft. And
when such men are asked whether the image so formed is caused by the
work of devils, or is due to some natural cause, they answer that it
is due to the power of Saturn over lead, the influence of that planet
being in other respects evil, and that the sun has a similar power
over gold. But what should be thought of this practice, and whether
it is lawful or not, will be discussed in the Second Part of this
treatise. For the Canonists say that it is lawful that vanity may be
confounded by vanity; but the Theologians hold a directly opposite
view, saying that it is not right to do evil that good may come.
In their last argument they advance several
objections. First, why do not witches become rich? Secondly, why,
having the favour of princes, do they not co-operate for the
destruction of all their enemies? Thirdly, why are they unable to
injure Preachers and others who persecute them?
For the first, it is to be said that witches are not generally
rich for this reason: that the devils like to show their contempt for
the Creator by buying witches for the lowest possible price. And
also, lest they should be conspicuous by their riches.
Secondly, they do not injure princes because they wish
to retain, as far as possible, their friendship. And if it is asked
why they do not hurt their enemies, it is answered that a good Angel,
working on the other side, prevents such witchcraft. Compare the
passage in Daniel: The Prince of the Persians withstood me for
twenty-one days. See S. Thomas in the Second Book of Sentences,
where he debates whether there is any contest among the good Angels,
and of what sort.
Thirdly, it is said
that they cannot injure Inquisitors and other officials, because they
dispense public justice. Many examples could be adduced to prove
this, but time does not permit it.