The second
question and proposition is that God justly permitted certain Angels
to sin in deed, which He could not have allowed unless they were
capable of sin; and that in like manner He preserved certain
creatures through grace, without their having previously suffered
temptation; and that He justly allows man both to be tempted and to
sin. And all this is clearly shown as follows. For it is a part of
Divine providence that each single thing should be left to its own
nature, and not be altogether impeded in its natural works. For, as
Dionysius says (de Diuin. Nom., IV), Providence is not a
destroyer, but a preserver of nature. This being so, it is manifest
that, just as the good of the race is better than the good of the
individual (Aristotle, Ethics, I), so also the good of the
universe takes precedence over the good of any particular creature.
Therefore we must add that, if men were prevented from sinning, many
steps to perfection would be removed. For that nature would be
removed which has it in its power to sin or not to sin; but it has
already been shown that this is a natural property of man's nature.
And let it be answered that, if there had been
no sin, but immediate confirmation, then there would never have
appeared what debt of grace in good works is due to God, and what the
power of sin has been able to effect, and many other things without
which the universe would suffer great loss. For it behoved that Satan
should sin, not through some outside suggestion, but that he should
find in himself the occasion of sin. And this he did when he wished
to be equal to God. Now this is to be understood neither simply and
directly, nor indirectly, but only with a reservation; and this is
declared according to the authority of Esaias xiv: I will
ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High.
For it must not be understood simply and directly, because in that
case he would have had a limited and erring understanding, in seeking
something which was impossible for him. For he knew that he was a
creature created by God, and therefore he knew that it was impossible
for him to become equal to his Creator. Neither, again, must it be
understood indirectly; for since the whole transparence of the air
consists in its subjection to the sun's rays; therefore nothing which
would be contrary to the good of its nature could be sought for by an
Angel. But he sought for equality with God, not absolutely, but with
a reservation, which was as follows. The nature of God has two
qualities, that of blessedness and goodness, and the fact that all
the blessedness and goodness of His creatures issues from Him.
Therefore the Angel, seeing that the dignity of his own nature
transcended that of the other creatures, wished and asked that the
blessedness and goodness of all the inferior creatures should be
derived from him. And he sought this in his own natural capacity,
that just as he was the first to be endowed in nature with those
qualities, so the other creatures should receive them from the
nobility of his nature. And he sought this of God, in perfect
willingness to remain subject to God so long as he had that power
granted to him. Therefore he did not wish to be made equal with God
absolutely, but only with a reservation.
It is further to be noted that, wishing to bring his desire to the
point of action, he suddenly made it known to others; and the
understanding of the other Angels of his desire, and their perverse
consenting to it, was also sudden. Therefore the sin of the First
Angel exceeded and preceded the sins of the others in respect of the
magnitude of his guilt and causality, but not in respect of duration.
See Apocalypse xii. The dragon falling from heaven drew with
him the third part of the stars. And he lives in the form of
Leviathan, and is king over all the children or pride. And, according
to Aristotle (Metaph., V), he is called king of princes,
inasmuch as he moves those who are subject to him according to his
will and command. Therefore his sin was the occasion of sin in
others, since he first, not having been tempted from outside, was the
external temptation of others.
And
that all these things happened instantaneously may be exemplified by
physical things; for the ignition of a gas, the sight of the flame,
and the impression formed by that sight all happen at one and the
same time.
I have put this matter at
some length; for in the consideration of that stupendous Divine
permission in the case of the most noble creatures with regard to the
one sin of ambition, it will be easier to admit particular
permissions in the case of the works of witches, which are in some
certain circumstances even greater sins. For in certain circumstances
the sins of witches are greater than that of the Angel or of our
first parents, as will be shown in the Second Part.
Now the fact that the providence of God permitted the
first man to be tempted and to sin is sufficiently clear from what
has been said concerning the transgression of the Angels. For both
man and the Angel were created to the same end, and left with
free-will, in order that they might receive the reward of blessedness
not without merit. Therefore, just as the Angel was not preserved
from his fall, in order that the power of sin on the one side and the
power of the confirmation of grace on the other side might work
together for the glory of the universe, so also ought it to be
considered in the case of man.
Wherefore S. Thomas (II, 23, art. 2) says: That by which God is
glorified ought not to be hindered from within. But God is glorified
in sin, when He pardons in mercy and when He punishes in justice;
therefore it behoves Him not to hinder sin. Let us, then, return to a
brief recapitulation of our proposition, namely, that by the just
providence of God man is permitted to sin for many reasons. First,
that the power of God may be shown, Who alone is unchanging while
every creature is variable. Secondly, that the wisdom of God may be
declared, Who can bring good out of evil, which could not be unless
God had allowed the creature to sin. Thirdly, that the mercy of God
may be made manifest, by which Christ through His death liberated man
who was lost. Fourthly, that the justice of God may be shown, which
not only rewards the good, but also punishes the wicked. Fifthly,
that the condition of man may not be worse than that of other
creatures, all of whom God so governs that He allows them to act
after their own nature; wherefore it behoved Him to leave man to his
own judgement. Sixthly, for the glory of men; that is, the glory of
the just man who could transgress but has not. And seventhly, for the
adorning of the universe; for as there is a threefold evil in sin,
namely, guilty, pain, and loss, so is the universe adorned by the
corresponding threefold good, namely, righteousness, pleasure, and
usefulness. For righteousness is adorned by guilt, pleasure by pain,
and all usefullness by loss. And by this the answer to the arguments
is made plain.
Solutions to the Arguments.
According
to the first argument it is heretical to maintain that the devil is
allowed power to injure men. But the opposite appears rather to be
true; for it is heretical to assert that God does not permit man, of
his own free-will, to sin when he wishes. And God permits much sin,
by reason of His power to hurt men in the punishment of the wicked
for the adorning of the universe. For it is said by S. Augustine in
his Book of Soliloques: Thou, Lord, hast commanded, and it is
so, that the shame of guilt should never be without the glory of
punishment.
And that is not a valid
proof of the argument which is taken from the wise ruler who keeps
away all defect and evil as far as he can. For it is quite different
with God, Who has an universal care, from one who has only a
particular care. For God, Whose care is universal, can bring good out
of evil, as is shown by what has been said.
For the second argument, it is clear that God's power as well as His
goodness and justice are manifest in His permission of sin. So when
it is argued that God either can or cannot prevent evil, the answer
is that He can prevent it, but that for the reasons already shown it
does not behove Him to do so.
Neither
is it valid to object that He therefore wishes evil to be; since He
can prevent it but will not; for, as has been shown in the arguments
for the truth, God cannot wish evil to be. He neither wishes nor does
not wish it, but He permits it for the perfecting of the universe.
In the third argument S. Augustine and Aristotle
are quoted on the subject of human knowledge, saying that it is
better for a man not to have knowledge of that which is evil and vile
for two reasons: first, that then he will have less opportunity to
think of evil, since we cannot understand many things at the same
time. And secondly, because knowledge of evil sometimes perverts the
will towards evil. But these arguments do not concern God, Who
without and detriment understands all the deeds of men and of
witches.
For the fourth argument: S.
Paul excepts the care of God from oxen, to show that a rational
creature has through free-will command over its actions, as has been
said. Therefore God has a special providence over him, that either
blame or merit may be imputed to him, and he may receive either
punishment or reward; but that God does not in this way care for the
irrational beasts.
But to argue from
that authority that the individuals of irrational creation have no
part in Divine providence would be heretical; for it would be to
maintain that all things are not subject to Divine providence, and
would be contrary to the praise which is spoken in Holy Scripture
concerning the Divine wisdom, which stretches mightily from end to
end and disposes all things well; and it would be the error of the
Rabbi Moses as was shown in the arguments for the truth.
For the fifth argument, man did not institute nature,
but puts the works of nature to the greatest use known to his skill
and strength. Therefore human providence does not extend to the
inevitable phenomena of nature, as that the sun will rise to-morrow.
But God's providence does extend to these things, since He is Himself
the author of nature. Wherefore also defects in nature, even if they
arise out of the natural course of things, are subject to Divine
providence. And therefore Democritus and the other natural
philosophers were in error when they ascribed whatever happened to
the inferior creation to the mere chance of matter.
For the last argument: although every punishment is
inflicted by God for sin, yet the greatest sinners are not always
afflicted with witchcraft. And this may be because the devil does not
wish to afflict and tempt those whom he sees to belong to him by just
title, or because he does not wish them to be turned back to God. As
it is said: Their plagues were multiplied, and they turned them to
God, etc. And that all punishment is inflicted by God for sin is
shown by what follows; for according to S. Jerome: Whatever we
suffer, we deserve for our sins.
Now
it is declared that the sins of witches are more grievous than those
of the bad angels and our first parents. Wherefore, just as the
innocent are punished for the sins of their fathers, so are many
blameless people damned and bewitched for the sins of witches.