Now we must consider the Divine
permission itself, touching which four things are asked. First,
whether it is necessary that this permission should accompany a work
of witchcraft. Secondly, that God in His justice permits a creature
naturally sinful to perpetrate witchcraft and other horrid crimes,
the other two necessary concomitants being presupposed. Thirdly, that
the crime of witchcraft exceeds all other evils which God permits to
be done. Fourthly, in what way this matter should be preached to the
people.
Concerning the third postulate
of this First Part, namely, the Divine permission, it is asked:
Whether it is as Catholic to affirm the Divine permission in these
works of witches, as it is quite heretical to contradict such an
affirmation? And it is argued that it is not heretical to maintain
that God does not permit so great power to the devil in this sort of
witchcraft. For it is Catholic, and not heretical, to refute such
things as appear to be to the disparagement of the Creator. And it is
submitted that it is Catholic to maintain that the devil is not
allowed such power of injuring men, since to hold the opposite
opinion seems to be a disparagement of the Creator. For it would then
follow that not everything is subject to the Divine providence, since
the all-wise Provider keeps away, as far as possible, all defect and
evil from those for whom He cares. And if the works of witchcraft are
permitted by God, they are not kept away by Him: and if He does not
keep them away, the God Himself is not a wise Provider, and all
things are not subject to His providence. But since this is false,
therefore it is false that God permits witchcraft.
And again, to permit a thing to happen presupposes in him who
permits it that either he can prevent it from happening if he wishes,
or he cannot prevent it even if he wishes; and neither of these
suppositions can apply to God. For in the first case, such a man
would be thought spiteful, and in the second case impotent. Then it
is incidentally asked: As to that bewitchment that happened to Peter,
if God could have prevented it, and did not do so, then God is either
despiteful or He does not care for all; but if He could not have
prevented it even if He wished, the He is not omnipotent. But since
it is not possible to maintain the opinion that God does not care for
all, and the rest, therefore it cannot be said that witchcraft is
done with the permission of God.
Besides, he who is responsible to himself and is the master of his
own actions is not subject to the permission or providence of any
governor. But men were made responsible to themselves by God,
according to Ecclesiasticus xv: God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his counsel. In particular,
the sins which men do are left in their own counsel, according to
their hearts' desire. Therefore not all evils are subject to Divine
permission.
Yet again, S. Augustine
says in the Enchiridion, as does also Aristotle in the ninth
book of Metaphysics: It is better not to know certain vile
things than to know them, but all that is good is to be ascribed to
God. Therefore God does not prevent the very vile works of
witchcraft, whether He permits or not. See also S. Paul in I.
Corinthians ix: Doth God take care of oxen? And the same holds
good of the other irrational beasts. Wherefore God takes no care
whether they are bewitched or not, since they are not subject to His
permission, which proceeds from His providence.
Again, that which happens of necessity has no need of
provident permission or prudence. This is clearly shown in
Aristotle's Ethics, Book II: Prudence is a right reasoning
concerning things which happen and are subject to counsel and choice.
But several effects of witchcraft happen of necessity; as when for
some reason, or owing to the influence of stars, diseases come, or
any other things which we judge to be witchcraft. Therefore they are
not always subject to Divine permission.
And again, if men are bewitched by Divine permission, then it is
asked: Why does this happen to one more than to another? If it be
said that it is because of sin, which abounds more in one than in
another, this does not seem valid; for then the greater sinners would
be the more bewitched, but this is manifestly not so, since they are
less punished in this world. As it is said: Well is it for the liars.
But, if this argument were good, they also would be bewitched.
Finally, it is clear from the fact that innocent children and other
just men suffer most from witchcraft.
But against these arguments: it is submitted that God permits evil to
be done, though He does not wish it; and this is for the perfecting
of the universe. See Dionysius, de Diuin. Nom. III: Evil will
be for all time, even to the perfecting of the universe. And S.
Augustine in the Enchiridion: In all things good and evil
consists the admirable beauty of the universe. So that what is said
to be evil is well ordained, and kept in its due place commends more
highly that which is good; for good things are more pleasing and
laudable when compared with bad. S. Thomas also refutes the opinion
of those who say that, although God has no wish for evil (since no
creature seeks for evil, either in its natural, or its animal, or in
its intellectual appetite, which is the will, whose object is good),
yet He is willing that evil should exist and be done. This he says to
be false; since God neither wishes evil to be done, nor wishes it not
to be done, but is willing to allow evil to be done; and this is good
for the perfecting of the universe.
And why it is erroneous to say that God wishes evil to be and to be
done, for the good of the universe, he says is for the following
reason. Nothing is to be judged good except what is good in itself
and not by accident. As the virtuous man is judge good in his
intellectual nature, not in his animal nature. But evil is not of
itself ordained for good, but by accident. For against the intention
of those who do evil, good results. In this way, against the
intention of witches, or against the intention of tyrants, was it
that through their persecutions the patience of the martyrs shone out
clearly.
Answer. This question
is as difficult to understand as it is profitable to elucidate. For
there is among the arguments, not so much of Laymen as of certain
Wise men, this in common; that they do not believe that such horrible
witchcraft as had been spoken of is permitted by God; being ignorant
of the causes of this Divine permission. And by reason of this
ignorance, since witches are not put down with the vengeance that is
due to them, they seem now to be depopulating the whole of
Christianity. Therefore that both learned and unlearned may be
satisfied in each way, according to the opinion of the Theologians,
we make our answer by the discussion of two difficulties. And first,
that he world is so subject to the Divine providence that He Himself
provides for all. Secondly, that in His justice He permits the
prevalence of sin, which consists of guilt, punishment, and loss, by
reason of His two first permissions, namely, the fall of the Angels
and that of our first parents. From which also it will be clear that
obstinately to disbelieve this smacks of heresy, since such a man
implicates himself in the errors of the infidels.
And as for the first, it is to be noted that, presupposing
that which pertains to the providence of God (see Wisdom xiv:
Thy providence, O Father, governeth all things), we ought also to
maintain that all things are subject to His providence, and that also
He immediately provides for all things. And to make this clear, let
us first refute a certain contrary error. For taking the text in Job
xxii: Thick clouds are a covering to him that He seeth not us; and He
walketh in the circuit of heaven: some have thought that the doctrine
pf S. Thomas, I, 22, means that only incorruptible things are subject
to Divine providence, such as the separate Essences, and the stars,
with also the species of lower things, which are also incorruptible;
but they said that the individuals of the species, being corruptible,
were not so subject. Wherefore they said that all lower things which
are in the world are subject to Divine providence in the universal,
but not in the particular or individual sense. But to others this
opinion did not seem tenable, since God cares for the other animals
just as He does for men. Therefore the Rabbi Moses, wishing to hold a
middle course, agreed with their opinion in saying that all
corruptible things are not individually entirely subject to Divine
governance, but only in a universal sense, as has been said before;
but he excepted men from the generality of corruptible things,
because of the splendid nature of their intellect, which is
comparable with the of the separate Essences. And so, according to
his opinion, whatever witchcraft happens to men comes from the Divine
permission; but not such as happens to the animals or to the other
fruits of the earth.
Now though this
opinion is nearer to the truth than that which altogether denies the
providence of God in worldly matters, maintaining that the world was
made by chance, as did Democritus and the Epicureans, yet it is not
without great fallacy. For it must be said that everything is subject
to Divine providence, not only in the general, but also in the
particular sense; and that the bewitching not only of men, but also
of animals and the fruits of the earth, comes from Divine and
provident permission. And this is plainly true; the providence and
ordinance of things to some end extend just so far as the causality
of them itself extends. To take an example from things that are
subject to some master; they are so far subject to his providence as
they are themselves under his control. But the causality which is of
God is the original agent, and extends itself to all beings, not only
in a general but also in an individual sense, and not only to things
incorruptible. Therefore, since all things must be of God, so all
things are cared for by Him, that is, are ordained to some end.
This point is touched by S. Paul in Romans
xiii: All things which are from God were ordained by Him. Which is to
say that, just as all things come from God, so also are all things
ordained by Him, and are consequently subject to His providence. For
the providence of God is to be understood as nothing else than the
reason, that is, the cause of the ordering of things to a purpose.
Therefore, in so far as all things are a part of one purpose, so also
are they subject to the providence of God. And God knows all things,
not only in the mass generally, but also in the individual
particularly. Now the knowledge which God has of things created is to
be compared with a craftsman's knowledge of his work: therefore, just
as all his work is subject to the order and providence of a
craftsman, so are all things subject to the order and providence of
God.
But this does not provide a
satisfactory explanation of the fact that God in justice permits evil
and witchcraft to be in the world, although He is Himself the
provider and governor of all things; for it would seem that, if this
is conceded, He ought to keep away all evil from those for whom He
cares. For we see among men that a wise provider does all that he can
to keep away all defect and harm from those who are his care;
therefore why does not God, in the same way, keep away all evil? It
must be noted that a particular and an universal controller or
provider are two very different matters. For the particular
controller must of necessity keep away all the harm he can, since he
is not able to extract good out of evil. But God is the universal
controller of the whole world, and can extract much good from
particular evils; as through the persecution of the tyrants came the
patience of the martyrs, and through the works of witches come the
purgation or proving of the faith of the just, as will be shown.
Therefore it is not God's purpose to prevent all evil, lest the
universe should lack the cause of much good. Wherefore S. Augustine
says in the Enchiridion: So merciful is Almighty God, that He
would not allow any evil to be in His works unless He were so
omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil.
And we have an example of this in the actions of
natural things. For although the corruptions and defects which occur
in natural things are contrary to the purpose of that particular
thing (as when a thief is hanged, or when animals are killed for
human food), they are yet in accordance with the universal purpose of
nature (as that man's life and property should be kept intact); and
thus the universal good is preserved. For it is necessary for the
conservation of the species that the death of one should be the
preservation of another. For lions are kept alive by the slaughter of
other animals.